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How Our Beliefs Contribute to Interpret
Actions⋆
Guillaume Aucher⋆⋆
University of Otago (NZ) - University Paul Sabatier (F)
aucher@cs.otago.ac.nz
Abstract. In update logic the interpretation of an action is often as-
sumed to be independent from the agents’ beliefs about the situation
(see [BMS04] or [Auc05]). In this paper we deal with this type of phe-
nomenon. We also deal with actions that change facts of the situation.
We use probability to model the notion of belief and our probabilistic
update mechanism satisﬁes the AGM postulates of belief revision.
Often in everyday life we interpret an action on the basis of our beliefs about the
situation. For example, assume that you see somebody drawing a ball from an
urn containing black balls and white balls. If you believe there is no particular
distribution in the urn then you will consider it equally probable that he draws a
white ball or a black ball; but if you believe there are more black than white balls
in the urn then you will consider it more probable than he draws a black ball than
a white ball: the interpretation of the same action is diﬀerent in both cases. The
literature about update logic does not deal with this kind of phenomenon (see
[BMS04] or [Auc05]). Likewise, actions that change the truth of propositions
are also neglected in the literature about update logic although they are quite
common in everyday life and hence interesting to formalize.
This paper is a continuation of [Auc05] and solves the problems raised there.
However, instead of using plausibilities we use probabilities because in this con-
text it is technically easier to deal with probability, and because I believe the
modeling of the notion of belief is better rendered with a subjective probability.
A novelty is also our use of inﬁnitesimals in order to express what would surprise
the agents and by how much.
In Sect.1 we motivate and deﬁne a structure slightly diﬀerent from the hy-
perreals where the probabilities of worlds take value. In Sect.2 we present the
core of the system in three parts : static (where we model static situations), dy-
namic (where we model actions) and the update mechanism. Finally, in Sect.3
we compare it with the AGM postulates and other relevant literature.
⋆ An extended version of this paper with proofs is available on my homepage.
⋆⋆ I thank my PhD supervisors Hans van Ditmarsch and Andreas Herzig for useful
comments and discussions.
M. Peˇchoucˇek, P. Petta, and L.Z. Varga (Eds.): CEEMAS 2005, LNAI 3690, pp. 276–285, 2005.
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1 Mathematical Preliminaries
In the proposed system, the probabilities of worlds and formulas will take value in
a particular mathematical structure (V,) (abusively denoted (V,≤)) diﬀerent
from the real numbers, based on hyperreal numbers (∗R,≤) (see [Adams75]
which uses them as well to give a probabilistic semantics to conditional logic).
Roughly speaking, hyperreal numbers are an extension of the real numbers to
include certain classes of inﬁnite and inﬁnitesimal numbers. A hyperreal number,
typically denoted ε, is said to be inﬁnitesimal iﬀ |ε| < 1/n for all integers n; and
ﬁnite if |x| < n for some integer n (in that case St(x) is the unique real number
closest to x). For an account on the hyperreal numbers, see chapter 1 of [Keis86].
What we would like to do is to approximate our expressions. That is to say,
in case an hyperreal number a is inﬁnitely smaller than b (that is to say, there is
an inﬁnitesimal ε such that a = ε.b), then we would want b+ a = b; for example
‘1 + ε = 1’,‘ε + ε2 = ε’,. . . Unfortunately, the hyperreal numbers do not allow
us to do that, so we are obliged to introduce a new structure (V,)1 deﬁned in
the footnote 1.
2 Dynamic Proba-Doxastic Logic
2.1 The Static Part
Deﬁnition 1. A proba-doxastic model (pd-model) M = (W, {∼j ; j ∈ G}, {Pj ; j
∈ G}, V, w0) is a tuple where:
1. W is a finite set of possible worlds.
2. w0 is the possible world corresponding to the actual world.
3. ∼j is an equivalence relation defined on W for each agent j.
4. Pj is an operator for each agent j which assigns to each world w a number
in ]0; 1] such that
∑
{Pj(v); v ∼j w} = 1 (*).
5. V is a valuation.
6. G is a set of agents.
Intuitive Interpretation. Items 1,2,5,6 are clear. It remains to give interpreta-
tions for items 3 and 4. The probabilistic operator Pj together with ∼j intuitively
model the epistemic state of mind of any agent j ∈ G. We set w ∼j v iﬀ agent j
can not distinguish world w from world v. This relation does not model the no-
tion of knowledge and we do not deal with this notion in this paper (see general
conclusion).
Among the worlds that agent j can not distinguish, there are some that
j conceives as potential candidates for the world in which j dwells, and some
1
V is the quotient structure of the set of positive hyperreal numbers ∗R+ by the
equivalence relation ≈ deﬁned by x ≈ y iﬀ ((St(x
y
) = 1 and y = 0) or x = y = 0).
We deﬁne a total order  on V by x  y iﬀ there are x ∈ x, y ∈ y such that
x ≤ y. Elements of V containing an inﬁnitesimal (resp. real) are abusively called
inﬁnitesimals (resp. reals) and we abusively denote  by ≤.
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that j would be surprised to hear somebody claiming that they correspond to
the world in which j dwells (whatever it is). The ﬁrst ones are called conceived
worlds and the second surprising worlds. The conceived worlds are assigned by
Pj a real value and the surprising worlds are assigned an inﬁnitesimal value
(both diﬀerent from 0). For example, some people would be surprised to hear
somebody claiming that some swans are black, although it is true. So for them
the actual world is a surprising world, indistinguishable from the only conceived
world where all swans are white.
Of course j might conceive some (conceived) worlds as better candidates
than others and this is expressed by the value of the probability of the world:
the larger the real probability value of the (conceived) world is, the more likely
it is for j. But that is the same for the surprising worlds: j might be more
surprised to hear some worlds than others. For example, if you play poker with
your brother (or a friend), you will never suspect that he cheats. However he
does so, and so carefully that you do not suspect anything. Then at the end
of the game if he announces to you that he has cheated, you will be surprised
(although it is something true in the actual world, which is then a surprising
world). But you will be even more surprised if he tells you that he has cheated
ﬁve times than if he has cheated only once. So the world where he has cheated
ﬁve times will be more surprising than the world where he has cheated once, and
these are both surprising worlds for you. Inﬁnitesimals enable us to express this:
the larger the inﬁnitesimal probability value of the (surprising) world is, the less
j would be surprised by this world. Anyway, that is why we need to introduce
these hyperreal numbers: to express these degrees of surprise that can not be
expressed by a single number like 0 (which then becomes useless for us).
Finally, the natural condition (*) ensures us that ([w]j ,P([w]j), Pj) (with
[w]j := {v; v ∼j w})) is a (nonstandard) probability space.
So, dwelling in one of the world of [w]j , j does not think consciously that her
respective surprising worlds in [w]j are possible (unlike conceived worlds), she
is just not aware of them. So they are useless to represent her beliefs which I
assume are essentially conscious. But still, these worlds are relevant for the (ob-
jective) modelisation. Indeed they provide some information about the epistemic
state of mind of j : namely what would surprise her. Intuitively, something that
you do not consider consciously as possible and that contradicts your beliefs is
often surprising for you when it is claimed by somebody else. These worlds will
moreover turn out to be very useful technically in case j has to revise her beliefs.
Deﬁnition 2. The syntax of the language LSt is defined by,
φ :=⊥| p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | Pj(φ) ≥ x | Cjφ where x ∈ [0; 1[.
Its semantics is defined by,
M,w |= Pj(φ) ≥ x iff
∑
{Pj(v);w ∼j v and M, v |= φ} ≥ x
M,w |= Cjφ iff
∑
{Pj(v);w ∼j v and M, v |= φ} = 1.
M,w |= Pj(φ) ≥ x should be read “in world w and for j, φ has a probability
greater than x ”. M,w |= Cjφ should be read “in world w, j is convinced (sure)
of φ ”.
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Note that above, if x is real then only the conceived worlds have to be con-
sidered in the sum (see Sect.1). Similarly the semantics of Cj amounts to say
that φ is true only in all the conceived worlds of [w]j (see Sect.1). This is not
surprising since only the conceived worlds describe the beliefs of the agent as we
just said above. So it is quite possible to have a surprising actual world where
¬φ is true and still j being convinced of φ (i.e. Cjφ): see the swan example above
with φ:=“All swans are white”.
Moreover, we can also express in this language what would surprise the agent,
and by how much. Indeed, in case x is inﬁnitesimal, M,w |= (Pj(φ) = x) should
be read “in world w, j would be surprised with intensity x to hear somebody
claiming that φ ”. (Note that the smaller x is, the higher the intensity of sur-
prise is.)
Remark 1. If we deﬁne the operator Bjφ by Pj(φ) >
1
2 , then the meaning of the
operators Bj and Cj are respectively exactly the same as the Lenzen’s notion of
(weak) belief and conviction (see [Len03]).Often these notions are confused and
we use in everyday life the same word “belief” to denote both of them.
Example 1. Consider two friends A and B in a fair, and an urn containing n =
2.k > 0 balls which are either white or black. A knows how many black balls
there are in the urn but B does not know it. Now say there are actually 0 black
ball in the urn. This situation is depicted in Fig.1, where pi stands for: “there are
i black balls in the urn ” and the double bordered world is the actual world. In
Fig.1 the probabilities of worlds are PA(x) = 1 and PB(x) =
1
n+1 for all worlds
x, so B believes there is no particular distribution in the urn.
Example 2. Consider the same example as before but now B is convinced (sure)
that there are more black balls than white balls (i.e. CB(pk+1 ∨ ... ∨ pn)). For
example her friend A might have lied to her by telling her so, and she fully
believed him. This situation is still depicted in Fig.1 but the probabilities of
worlds here are PA(x) = 1 for all worlds x, and PB(wi) = ǫ for all i ∈ {0, .., k},
PB(wi) =
1
k
for all i ∈ {k + 1, .., n}. The worlds where there are less black balls
than white balls are all (equally) surprising.
w0 : p0
B
 wk : pk
B wk+1 : pk+1
B
 wn : pn
Fig. 1. ‘urn’ Examples 1 and 2 (without speciﬁcations of the probabilities of worlds
for each example: see text)
Throughout this paper we apply our system to the example of the introduc-
tion. So note that Examples 1 and 2 only diﬀer in what the agent B believes.
2.2 The Dynamic Part
Deﬁnition 3. A generic action model is a structure Σ = (Σ,S, {∼j; j ∈ G},
{PΓj ;Γ is a maximal consistent subset of S and j ∈ G}, {Postσ;σ ∈ Σ}, σ0)
where
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1. Σ is a finite set of possible actions.
2. σ0 is the actual action.
3. ∼j is an equivalence relation defined on Σ for each agent j.
4. S is a set of formulas of LSt and their negations.
5. PΓj is an operator indexed by each agent j and each maximal consistent
subset Γ of S which assigns to each possible action a number in [0;1], such
that for each possible action σ and agent j0
if PΓj0 (σ) = 0 then P
Γ
j (σ) = 0 for all j ∈ G (*).
6. Postσ is a function which takes as argument a propositional letter p and
gives two formulas of LSt Postσ(p) := (Post
+
σ (p), Post
−
σ (p)) such that |=
¬(Post+σ (p) ∧ Post
−
σ (p)) (**).
7. G is a set of agents.
Intuitive Interpretation. Items 1,2,3,7 are totally similar to deﬁnition 1. It
remains to give interpretation to items 4,5,6 of the deﬁnition.
Item 4. S corresponds to the set of formulas (and their negation) that are
relevant for the agents in a particular world in order to assign a probability to
an action occurring in this world. Consequently, the larger the size of S will be,
the more the interpretation by the agents of the actions will be dependant on
their beliefs (see Sect.2.3).
Item 5. PΓj is the probability for j, if she assumes she is in a particular world
where the set of formulas Γ is true, that the action σ is occurring.
Just as in the static case, relatively to a world w satisfying Γ and among
indistinguishable actions for the agent j, we have conceived actions (which are
assigned a real number) and surprising actions (which are assigned an inﬁnitesi-
mal). The former are possible actions that the agent conceives as possible candi-
dates while one of the indistinguishable actions actually takes place. The latter
are possible actions that j would be surprised to hear somebody claiming that
they took place while one of the indistinguishable actions actually took place.
For example, if you play poker with your brother (or a friend) and at a certain
point he cheats while you do not suspect anything, then the actual action of
cheating will be a surprising action for you (of value ε) and will be indistin-
guishable for you from the conceived action where nothing particular happens
(of value 1).
Just as in the static case, the relative strength for j of the indistinguishable
actions (conceived and surprising), relatively to a world where Γ is true, is
expressed by the value of the operator PΓj .
Finally, note that we can have PΓj (σ) = 0. This means that the action σ
can not physically be performed in a world where Γ is true. This impossibility
is public and inherent to the possible action, that is why we have the condition
(*). That replaces the notion of precondition in [BMS04] and [Auc05].
From now on, we note Pwj (σ) := P
Γ
j (σ) for the unique Γ such that
M,w |= Γ .
Item 6. The function Postσ deals with the problem of determining what facts
will be true in a world after the action σ takes place. Intuitively, Post+σ (p) (resp.
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σ
B
τ
S = {pi,¬pi; i = 0..n}.
P
{pi}
B (σ) =
i
n
, P
{pi}
B (τ ) = 1−
i
n
for all i.
P
{pi}
A (σ) = 1 for all i = 0, P
{p0}
A (σ) = 0.
P
{pi}
A (τ ) = 1 for all i = n, P
{pn}
A (τ ) = 0.
PΓA (σ) = P
Γ
A (τ ) = P
Γ
B (σ) = P
Γ
B (τ ) = 0 for all Γ = {pi}.
Post+σ (pn) =⊥, Post
−
σ (pn) = ⊤.
Post+σ (pi) = pi+1, Post
−
σ (pi) = ¬pi+1 for all i < n.
Post+τ (pn) =⊥, Post
−
τ (pn) = ⊤.
Post+τ (pi) = pi, Post
−
τ (pi) = ¬pi for all i < n.
Fig. 2. A draws a (white) ball, observes it and puts it in his pocket
Post−σ (p)) represents the precondition in any world w for p to become true (resp.
false) in (w, σ) after the performance of σ. The role of condition (**) is to avoid
the case where the performance of an action σ in a world w could provoke at
the same time both p and ¬p to be true in the resulting world (w, σ).
Example 3. Now, let us resume the ‘urn’ example. Consider the action whereby
A draws a ball from the urn (which is actually white), looks at it and puts
it in his pocket, B sees A doing that but can not see the ball. This action is
depicted in Fig.2. The maximal consistent sets are represented by their ‘positive’
components, so {pi} refers to the set {pi,¬pk; k = i}.
It looks quite complicated but the ideas behind are quite simple. Action σ
(resp. τ) stands for “A draws a black (resp. white) ball, observes it and puts it in
his pocket”. Clearly B can not distinguish σ from τ . However if B assumes she is
in a world where there are i black balls then for her the probability that A draws
a black (resp. white) ball is i
n
(resp. 1− i
n
): P
{pi}
B (σ) =
i
n
and P
{pi}
B (τ) = 1−
i
n
.
Moreover there can not be n black balls in the urn since A put one ball in his
pocket (Post+σ (pn) =⊥, Post
−
σ (pn) = ⊤ and Post
+
τ (pn) =⊥, Post
−
τ (pn) = ⊤),
but if he draws one black ball then there is one black ball less (Post+σ (pi) = pi+1,
Post−σ (pi) = ¬pi+1 for all i < n), otherwise the number of black balls remains
the same (Post+τ (pi) = pi, Post
−
τ (pi) = ¬pi for all i < n).
2.3 The Update Mechanism
Deﬁnition 4. Given a pd-model M = (W, {∼j; j ∈ G}, {Pj ; j ∈ G}, V, w0) and
a generic action model Σ = (Σ,S, {∼j; j ∈ G}, {P
Γ
j ;Γ is a m. c. subset of S and
j ∈ G}, {Postσ;σ ∈ Σ}, σ0), we define their update product to be the pd-model
M ⊗Σ = (W ⊗Σ, {∼′j; j ∈ G}, {P
′
j ; j ∈ G}, V
′, w′0), where:
1. W ⊗Σ = {(w, σ) ∈W ×Σ;Pwj (σ) > 0}.
2. (w, σ) ∼′j (v, τ) iff w ∼j v and σ ∼j τ .
3. We set
P
[w]j
j (σ) =
∑
{Pj(v).P
v
j (σ);w ∼j v}∑
{Pj(v).P vj (τ);w ∼j v, σ ∼j τ}
.
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Then
P ′j(w, σ) =
Pj(w).P
[w]j
j (σ)∑
{Pj(v);w ∼j v and P vj (σ) > 0}
.
4. V ′(p) = {(w, σ) ∈ W ⊗Σ;M,w |= Post+σ (p) ∨ (p ∧ ¬Post
−
σ (p))}.
5. w′0 = (w0, σ0).
Intuitive Interpretation and Motivations.
Items 1,2,5 are completely similar to the ‘BMS’ system ( [BMS04] or [Auc05])
except for item 1 where the precondition is replaced by Pwj (σ) > 0 (see section
above). So, we only motivate items 3 and 4.
Item 3. We want to determine P ′j(w, σ) = Pj(W ∩ A) where W stands for ‘we
were in world w before σ occurred’ and A for ‘action σ occurred’. More formally,
in the probability space [(w, σ)]j := {(v, τ); (v, τ) ∼j (w, σ)}, W stands for
{(w, τ); τ ∼j σ} and A for {(v, σ); v ∼j w} and we can check that W ∩ A =
{(w, σ)}.
Probability theory tells us that
Pj(W ∩A) = Pj(W |A).Pj(A).
We ﬁrst determine Pj(W |A), that is to say the probability that j was in
world w given the extra assumption that action σ occurred in this world. We
reasonably claim
Pj(W |A) =
Pj(w)∑
{Pj(v);w ∼j v and P vj (σ) > 0}
.
That is to say, we conditionalize the probability of w for j (i.e. Pj(w)) to
the worlds where the action σ took place and that may correspond for j to the
actual world w (i.e. {v;w ∼j v and P
v
j (σ) > 0}). That is how it would be done
in classical probability theory. The intuition behind it is that we now possess
the extra piece of information that σ occurred in w. So the worlds indistinguish-
able from w where the action σ did not occur do not play a role anymore for
the determination of the probability of w. We can then get rid of them and
conditionalize on the remaining relevant worlds.
It remains to determinate Pj(A) which we also denote P
[w]j
j ; that is to say
the probability for j that σ occurred. Agent j does not know in which world of
[w]j := {v; v ∼j w} she dwells. So this action could occur for j in any world v
of [w]j , each time with probability P
v
j (σ). So we would ﬁrst be tempted to take
the average of them: Pj(A) = P
[w]j
j (σ) =
∑
{Pvj (σ);v∼jw}
n
, where n is the number
of world in [w]j .
But we have more information than that. j does not know in which world of
[w]j she is, but she has a preference among them, which is expressed by Pj . So
we can reﬁne our expression above and take the center of mass (or barycenter)
of the P vj (σ)s balanced respectively by the weights Pj(v)s (whose sum equals 1),
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instead of taking roughly the average (which is actually also a center of mass
but with weights 1
n
). We get Pj(A) = P
[w]j
j (σ) =
∑
{Pj(v).P
v
j (σ); v ∼j w}.
Finally, we would naturally want
∑
{P
[w]j
j (τ); τ ∼j σ} = 1 so that ([σ]j ,
P([σ]j), P
[w]j
j ) (where [σ]j := {τ ; τ ∼j σ}) forms a (nonstandard) probabilistic
space. So we set
Pj(A) = P
[w]j
j (σ) =
∑
{Pj(v).P
v
j (σ);w∼jv}∑
{Pj(v).Pvj (τ);w∼jv,σ∼jτ}
.
We then get the expected result by multiplication. We can easily check that
its sum on [(w, σ)]j is equal to 1.
Item 4. Intuitively, this formula says that a fact p is true after the performance
of σ in w iﬀ the condition for p to become true after σ was satisﬁed in w, or else
if p was already true in w but the condition to switch it to false was not satisﬁed
in w.
Remark 2. Note the diﬀerence between Pwj (σ) and P
[w]j
j (σ): the former is deter-
mined by what is true in w and the latter by what j believes in w (see Examples
4 and 5 below). Moreover, since what j believes is the same in every world of
[w]j , we indeed have P
[w]j
j (σ) = P
[w′]j
j (σ) for all w
′ ∈ [w]j .
From this product mechanism, we can easily deﬁne a dynamic language in
the line of [BMS04] or [Auc05] that we do not spell out here.
Example 4. Let us come back to our ‘urn’ Example 1. Assume now that A draws
a (white) ball from the urn, looks at it and puts it in his pocket, action depicted
in Fig.3. Then because B does not have any particular preference about the
distribution of the urn, she should believe equally that A draws a black ball and
a white ball (see introduction). That is indeed the case : P
[wi]B
B (σ) = P
[wi]B
B (τ) =
1
2 . Note the diﬀerence between P
wi
B (σ)(=
i
n
) and P
[wi]j
B (σ)(=
1
2 ) (see remark 2).
If we perform the full update mechanism, then we get the pd-model of Fig.3
with probabilities PA(x) = 1 and PB(x) =
1
2n for all worlds x. In this model all
the worlds are equally probable for B and there can not be n black balls in the
urn (pn) since one has been withdrawn.
(w1, σ) : p0
B
B
(w2, σ) : p1
B

B
(wk, σ) : pk1
B
B
(wk+1, σ) : pk+1
B

B
(wn, σ) : pn1
B
(w0, τ) : p0
B
(w1, τ) : p1
B
 (wk1, τ) : pk1
B
(wk, τ) : pk
B
 (wn1, τ) : pn1
Fig. 3. situation of Examples 1 and 2 after A draws a white ball, looks at it and puts
it in his pocket (without speciﬁcation of the probabilities of worlds for each example:
see text).
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Example 5. Let us now come back to our ‘urn’ Example 2. Assume the same
action as above occurs (depicted in Fig.2). However, now B is convinced that
there are more black balls than white. Consequently, she should consider it more
likely that A draws a black ball than a white ball (see introduction). That is the
case indeed: P
[wi]B
B (σ) =
3
4 +
1
4k > P
[wi]B
B (τ) =
1
4 −
1
4k .
If we perform the full update, then we still get the pd-model of Fig.3 but with
diﬀerent probability values: PA(x) = 1 for all worlds x; PB(wi, σ) = ε.(
3
4 +
1
4k )
for i = 1..k; PB(wi, σ) =
1
k
.(34 +
1
4k ) for i = k + 1..n; PB(wi, τ) =
ε
4 for
i = 0..k; PB(wi, τ) =
1
4k for i = k + 1..n − 1. Note the grading of the sur-
prising worlds. It states that B would be a bit more surprised to hear some-
body claiming that “there were as many or less black balls than white balls
and A drew a white ball” (worlds (wi, τ), i = 0..k), than to hear somebody
claiming that “there were as many or less black balls than white balls and A
drew a black ball” (worlds (wi, σ), i = 1..k). This is coherent since she believed
more that A drew a black ball than she believed that he drew a white ball (i.e.
P
[wi]B
B (σ) > P
[wi]B
B (τ)).
3 Comparisons
Comparison with the AGM postulates. We can prove that, under the as-
sumption that the AGM notion of ‘belief’ (see [GardRott95]) corresponds to
the Lenzen’s notion of conviction (see remark 1), the 8 AGM postulates are
fulﬁlled.
Comparison with Reiter’s situation calculus. It turns out (surprisingly)
that the way we deal with change of facts is completely similar to the way
Reiter solves the frame problem in the situation calculus (see [Reit01]), and the
assumptions he makes about actions are fulﬁlled in our framework.
Comparison with Kooi’s system. Kooi’s dynamic probabilistic system (see
[Kooi03]), based on the static approach by Fagin and Halpern in [FH94], does
not make any particular assumption about the relation between probability and
epistemic relation (explored in [FH94]); contrary to our approach. Moreover,
he deals only with public announcement, and in this particular case our update
mechanism is basically the same as his.
Comparison with van Benthem’s system. van Benthem’s system (see
[vBen03]) seems similar to ours, but he does not deal with actions changing
facts and does not show the inﬂuence of beliefs on the interpretation of ac-
tions. In that respect, he does not distinguish Pwj (σ) from P
[w]j
j (σ) as we do
(see Remark 2), and his ambiguous Pwj (σ) seems to be diﬀerent from ours if
we refer to his example. His probabilistic update rule (without motivations) is
also diﬀerent. Besides, his update product can not be iterated because he deals
with worlds rather than maximal consistent sets in the probabilities of actions.
Anyway, his comparison with the Bayesian setting and other insights are still
valid here.
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4 Conclusion
We have proposed a system which models belief with probability and whose
update performs genuine belief revision (unlike the existing approaches in the
literature). So it indirectly oﬀers a new probabilistic approach to belief revision.
Moreover, in our modeling we have introduced surprising worlds necessary
to model incorrect beliefs. Their relative degrees of surprise for the agent is ex-
pressed by inﬁnitesimals. This use of inﬁnitesimal has also enabled us to express
what would surprise the agent and by how much. This is of importance since we
want to describe with most accuracy any epistemic state of mind of any agent,
including what would surprise her. In that respect the notion of knowledge can
also be added to this dynamic epistemic system, which then validates all the
Lenzen’s axioms for belief and knowledge (that I consider as most accurate and
expressive to describe epistemic states).
Finally, we have also incorporated actions that change facts of the situation
and showed from a formal point of view how our beliefs can aﬀect our interpreta-
tion of actions. In a sense this last point complements and reverses the classical
view whereby only our interpretation of actions aﬀects our beliefs and not the
other way around, as in belief revision theory.
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